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REREADING FEAR AND TREMBLING 
Earl McLane 
This paper offers a rereading of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in the 
light of the Edifying Discourses that accompanied it. Such a rereading serves 
to mitigate the picture of God that one may initially receive from the work-
the picture of God as a 'capricious despot.' While Fear and Trembling does 
contain a "divine command" ethic, it is an ethic based on the thesis that God 
is love-an ethic expressed in the Biblical injunction: 'You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your 
mind. [And] you shall love your neighbor as yourself' (Matt. 22:37-39). Such 
a religious ethic may still require a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.' 
Abraham provides an illustration of such a suspension because he believed 
that he was called upon to sacrifice his son. However, in the light of 
Kierkegaard's "subjectivity is truth" thesis, God need not be seen as in fact 
issuing such a command. Such a non-literal rereading, it is argued, is more 
consistent with the emphasis on the unchangeableness of God-a constant 
theme of the religious discourses. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that many begin-and end-their read-ing of 
Kierkegaard with Fear and Trembling. The story of Abraham-of his will-
ingness to raise the knife over his son in obedience to the divine command-
has made him the father of faith to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. To others, 
however, Abraham remains an object of horror. Likewise, while many have 
found inspiration in Kierkegaard's retelling of the story, others have found 
the fact that he would seriously concern himself with such a tale to be itself 
horrifying. Milic Capek writes: "It is ... discouraging to see Kierkegaard ... ad-
miring this story in its crude and primitive form and thus sacrificing the moral 
qualities of God to his alleged omnipotence."! He finds in Kierkegaard " ... the 
idea of a despotic God whose capricious and arbitrary will makes and un-
makes the moral law and who insists on absolute slavish obedience on the 
part of man."2 According to Capek, such a view of God is due to the influence 
of Luther-and further back to that of Scotus and Ockham. Even sympathetic 
interpreters of Kierkegaard agree that such a picture of God can be found in 
Fear and Trembling. D. Z. Phillips, for example, writes: "There [i.e., in Fear 
and Trembling], Kierkegaard speaks as if one can understand God's com-
mands simply by saying that God commanded them. One could say 'God 
commands X' where 'X' could be any given value whatever."3 
Whether such a picture of God, with its corollary of faith as blind obedi-
ence, is to be taken as Kierkegaard's own is crucial to determining the char-
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acter of his religious thought. 4 There are, of course, ways of dissociating 
Kierkegaard from such a picture. The work is, after all, by a pseudonym-and 
we have Kierkegaard's own word that the views of the pseudonyms are not 
to be identified with his own.s Further, the use of a pseudonym named Jo-
hannes de Silentio (John of Silence) and, therefore, a recurring emphasis on 
silence, along with the motto from Hamann all suggest that the message 
conveyed by the book will be a hidden one.6 Again, Abraham is an Old 
Testament figure who, from the standpoint of Christianity, would represent a 
limited conception of God and faith.7 There is also the obvious polemical 
character of the book.s 
Something can be said in behalf of each of these points. One cannot, 
therefore, identify what Johannes has to say about faith with Kierkegaard's 
own position. On the other hand, to view the book as fundamentally ironic, 
as some have done9 , may lead one to overlook the element of seriousness and 
the fact that the book does tell us something about Kierkegaard's own views. 
It is clear that Kierkegaard saw some analogy between his own case and that 
of Abraham. While he was writing Fear and Trembling, it seems that he was 
pondering the possibility that as Abraham-after giving up Isaac-had re-
ceived him back through faith so might he, in a similar fashion, get Regine 
back. Indeed he writes in his Journal at this time: "If I had had faith, I would 
have stayed with Regine" (JP, 5, #5664.)10 He would also agree with Johannes 
that there are "teleological suspensions of the ethical." He writes in his 
Journal: 
I am a poet. But long before I became a poet I was intended for the life of 
religious individuality. And the event whereby I became a poet was an ethical 
break or a teleological suspension of the ethical. And both of these things 
made me want to become something more than the poet. (JP, 6, #6718.) 
The difficulty arises in saying just what is involved in such a suspension. 
Some have seen such a claim as directed primarily against a moral position 
such as Kant's-i.e. as insisting that there are exceptions to a morality based 
on universal or general rules. 11 Others have contended that the focus of the 
book is on an Hegelian conception of the ethical. 12 That such would seem to 
be the case is indicated by the fact that the ethical is characterized in terms 
of "social morality" (Saedelighed)-as well as the fact that most of the 
quotations are drawn from Hegel (See, e.g., FT, 54-5, 68-9, 82.) The "ethical" 
is characterized as "the universal" and the ethical task of the individual is 
to-" ... continually express himself in this, to annul his singularity in order 
to become the universal" (FT, 54). Also, after introducing each of the three 
problems with a characterization of the "ethical" and its requirements, we 
find it repeated that if such a characterization is correct, then Hegel is right-
and Abraham is a murderer and unjustified in keeping silent (FT, 54, 68, 82.) 
There is also the interesting irony that the sacrifice of a child on the altar of 
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the State is considered, contrary to Kant, ethically justifiable. 13 Hence, the 
"ethical" that is to be "suspended" seems primarily to be that of Hegel-die 
Sittlichkeit. It would also seem, however, that he-and Kierkegaard-also 
have Kant in mind. Despite the many affinities of what Kierkegaard has to 
say about the "ethical" with the views of Kant as well as his admiration for 
him, he is clearly at odds with Kant on the issue of autonomy.14 This differ-
ence is clearly reflected in Kant's well-known reaction to the Abraham story. 
In his Der Streit der Fakultiiten, Kant says: 
Abraham should have replied to this primitive divine voice: 'That I may not 
kill my good son is absolutely certain. But that you who appear to me are 
God is not certain, even though the voice were to sound from the very 
heavens ... For that a voice which one seems to hear cannot be divine one can 
be certain of...in case what is commanded is contrary to the moral law. 
However majestic or supernatural it may appear to be, one must regard it as 
a deception. IS 
Against Kant, Kierkegaard insists that there are exceptions. Against Hegel, 
he insists that if faith is to be a reality, there must be a place for the individual 
"beyond" the realm of morality as Sittlichkeit. Against both, he is concerned 
to show the inadequacy of any purely rational conception of morality that 
leaves no room for faith as a personal relation of the individual to GOd. 16 
Both in effect leave God "out of the picture." 
Yet to insist on keeping God in the picture, as well as on the possibility of 
a "teleological suspension of the ethical," on the possibility of a conflict of 
one's religious duty with one's ethical duty, is this not to identify oneself with 
the picture of God described earlier? Must this, then, be taken as 
Kierkegaard's own view? My proposal is that we should look again at Fear 
and Trembling, particularly taking into account what he has to say elsewhere 
but especially in the Edifying Discourses that accompanied the publication 
of the work. That is to say, we should take seriously his statement that he 
was a "religious writer" from the beginning of his authorship.17 
A central theme of these discourses is love. In fact, we find here many of 
the points that are developed later in the Works of Love, a book often regarded 
as isolated from the mainstream of the authorship. Two of them are on the 
topic "Love Shall Cover a Multitude of Sins." They offer, in effect, a char-
acterization of Christian love. Such love is said not to be found in paganism. 
While such love is to some extent present in Judaism, the latter is also said 
to be lacking. "For the pious Jew also bore witness to love, but this love was 
the child of mutability and change, and he knew how to hate the enemy. He 
even ascribed vengeance to the Lord because he himself had it. ... "18 By 
contrast, regarding Christian love it is said: 
And only this is love which never becomes something else, this which gives 
everything and because of this, demands nothing, this which demands noth-
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ing, and therefore has nothing to lose, this which blesses, and blesses when 
it is cursed, this which loves its neighbor, but whose enemy is also his neighbor, 
this which leaves vengeance to the Lord, because it comforts him to believe that 
the Lord is even more merciful than he himself is. (ED DISC, I, 63.) 
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This discourse goes on to cite Jesus' injunction that we are to 'turn the other 
cheek' and that we are to 'forgive seventy times seven' (ED DISC, I, 72). 
Throughout, God is depicted as unchanging love. The image is recalled of 
the father of the prodigal son who stands with open arms and awaits the erring 
(ED DISC, I, 76-77.) 
The second discourse on this theme notes how the Apostle Peter, even 
though the end of things is said to be at hand, nevertheless, admonished the 
early Christians to love their neighbor even in the minor relations of life (ED 
DISC, I, 81.) The discourse speaks also to us, for everyone must die and come 
to judgment (ED DISC, I, 82.) Love, however, can prepare us for judgment 
(ED DISC, I, 82.) For such love can also uncover our own multiplicity of 
sins (ED DISC, I, 84.) The discourse closes with the story of a fallen woman 
who appeared uninvited at a dinner party for Jesus held at the home of a 
Pharisee. The woman washed Jesus' feet with her tears, dried them with her 
hair, kissed them, and anointed them. Her many sins stood revealed before 
all. Her tears of repentance turned to tears of worship. But then, as she knelt 
weeping at Jesus' feet, 
Then love discovered what the world hid-the love within her; and since it 
had not triumphed in her, the Savior's love came to help, so that he 'to whom 
five hundred pennies were forgiven, must love most; and He made the love 
in her even more powerful in hiding the multitude of sins, the love which 
was already there for 'her many sins were forgiven her, because she loved 
much.' (ED DISC, I, 90.) 
Such a love-a love that is said to be beyond all understanding, even fool-
ishness to the understanding-can come to the aid of our love, drive out the 
fear, and conceal a multitude of sins (ED DISC, I, 89.) 
The subject of the third discourse, "Strengthened in the Inner Man," is faith, 
the topic of the two discourses that had earlier accompanied Either/Or. The 
Scripture text is taken from the third chapter of Ephesians in which Paul, 
writing from his prison at Rome, prays that his followers may be strengthened 
with might by God's Spirit, that Christ might dwell in their hearts by faith, 
that they might be rooted and grounded in love. He is concerned that they 
might be offended at his sufferings, that they might lose heart and abandon 
the teaching, a teaching that he believed had been communicated to him by 
a special revelation (ED DISC, I, 94-96.) Paul, however, transformed his 
suffering into a testimony for his teaching. Indeed, "Even if afflicted, yet he 
was always joyful; even though poor, he always made many rich; even though 
he had nothing, he still possessed everything" (ED DISC, I, 96.) Through 
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such inner strengthening, through such faith, Paul was able to give thanks 
always. 
Such strengthening, such faith, cannot come through knowledge of the 
world. Knowledge is indifferent in its relation to the world, and its testimony 
is always ambiguous (ED DISC, I, 100-102.) Faith is not acquired by "col-
lecting evidence." As he says in an earlier discourse, to expect something 
special, something particular, is to lack faith (ED DISC, I, 31.) 
But if he is truly concerned, then will everything through God serve for the 
strengthening in the inner man; for God is faithful and does not leave Himself 
without testimony. But God is Spirit, and therefore can give only spiritual 
testimony, that is in the inner man; every external testimony from God, if 
one could imagine such a thing, is only a deception. (ED DISC, I, 103.) 
Through faith, which can be had only through being constantly acquired, one 
comes to realize that every gift is a good and perfect gift (ED DISC, I, 35ff.) 
Whatever happens, if it is received with humility and thankfulness, can serve 
for strengthening in the inner man (ED DISC, I, 106; 45-47.) Indeed, such a 
believer comes to see that his faith and his thankfulness are themselves gifts 
(ED DISC, I, 116.) The conviction that God is love gives rise to a love born 
of repentance. Such a believer can, as it were, let the whole world go and 
can then receive it back again as a gift from God, as from a loving father. 
Only then can he truly have the world, rather than the world having him (ED 
DISC, I, 21-22.) 
In summary, we find in these discourses the view that God is love and that 
faith is a trust in this love. That such love can reveal to us our sins and hence 
call us to repentance. That such love demands of us not only that we love 
God in return, but that we love our neighbor as well. That such love calls us 
in effect to give up the world that we might receive it back again as a gift. 
That such love is revealed in Jesus, in his life and in his "covering" or 
forgiving of sins. It is true that the words 'paradox' and 'offence' are not used 
with reference to Jesus, though the love that he exemplifies is said to be 
"folly" to the understanding. Nevertheless the two stories of Jesus' "covering" 
of sins must certainly call to mind the fact that the Pharisiees were "offended" 
that he would forgive sins-for only God can forgive sins. 
Such a "picture" of God stands in sharp contrast with the one that appears 
in Fear and Trembling. However, let us read again-keeping in mind what 
Kierkegaard has given us with his "right hand."19 We are now more likely to 
see that Abraham's faith is not just an occasional response to an 'absurd' 
divine command. Nor was this the first time that he had been called upon to 
"suspend the ethical."20 Johannes, in his eulogy of Abraham, emphasizes that 
it was by faith that Abraham left his father and emigrated to another land, by 
faith that he received the promise that in his seed all the generations of the 
earth would be blessed, by faith that he held to this promise far beyond the 
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time that Sarah could be supposed to have children (FT, 17.) He had fought 
with time and had kept the faith (FT, 19.) His faith is exemplified in a life 
of trust. According to Stephen Evans, it is this trust that provides the "inter-
pretative framework" that leads Abraham to conclude, appearances to the 
contrary, that his act is the right one. Evans contends: 
Abraham's trust was faith in the truest sense of the word. Though perhaps 
grounded in his experience of God it was by no means a belief to be treated 
as an experimental hypothesis, but a conviction to be clung to through thick 
and thin.21 
Through his trial, Abraham is depicted as maintaining his trust in God's 
promise, his trust that somehow, though it may appear absurd-especially to 
a non-believer like Johannes-he will get Isaac back. 
His trust is also seen as an expression of his love for God. According to 
Johannes, the notion of an absolute duty to God is characterized in terms of 
God's demand for absolute love (FT, 72-73.) Yet, it is also Abraham's duty 
to love Isaac. 
He must love Isaac with his whole soul. Since God claims Isaac, he must, if 
possible, love him even more, and only then can he sacrifice him, for it is 
indeed this love for Isaac that makes his act a sacrifice by its paradoxical 
contrast to his love for God. (FT, 74.) 
As he says elsewhere, such an absolute duty may require one to embody a 
paradoxical expression of the ethical, " ... such as, for example, that love to 
God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the neighbor-an 
expression opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty" (FT, 70.) Thus, 
though it may not appear so to the understanding, Abraham's action can be 
seen as falling under the Royal Law: 'You shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great 
and first commandment. And a second is like it, you shall love your neighbor 
as yourself' (Matthew 22:37-39.) Is this not the "ethic" that we have found 
in the Discourses? Yet, the love called for there was Christian love. Does 
such a possibility appear in Fear and Trembling? Johannes does speak of a 
more fearful "teleological suspension of the ethical" than that faced by Abra-
ham. His comments occur in the context of the story of Agnes and the Mer-
man. He tells us: 
In sin, the single individual is already higher ... than the universal, because it 
is a contradiction on the part of the universal to want to demand itself from 
the person who lacks the conditio sine qua non .. . An ethics that ignores sin 
is a completely futile discipline, but if it affirms sin, then it has eo ipso 
exceeded itself. (FT, 98-99.) 
He adds in a footnote: "As soon as sin emerges, ethics founders precisely on 
repentance; for repentance is the highest ethical expression, but precisely as 
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such it is the deepest ethical self-contradiction" (FT, 98n.) Is it not likely that 
a Lutheran reading this passage would call to mind the image of the Law and 
the Gospel? Are we not indirectly referred here to an "ethical" that does not 
ignore sin-an ethic that also provides a means of "covering" sin?22 Ronald 
Green has urged that it is in this passage regarding sin and repentance that 
we find the "key" to deciphering Fear and Trembling. It contains not only 
the "secret message" regarding faith but also reveals, at least partially, 
Kierkegaard's own secret. He does not deny that the book was also directed 
to Regine, to convey to her why he could not marry her, why she had to be 
'sacrificed.' But this "message" is too obvious and too much concerned with 
Kierkegaard's own situation to be the real "message."23 In contrast to Abraham, 
who is seen as righteous, Kierkegaard saw himself as guilty: indeed he was 
laboring under a tremendous burden of guilt and melancholy, both personal 
and familial. According to Green: 
It was partly because of the burden of this sin ... that he believed himself 
unable to go through with the marriage: fearful, perhaps, that his melancholy 
disposition, which was itself one consequence of this tradition of familial sin, 
would ruin young Regine's life and make a happy union impossible. But the 
issue of sin in Kierkegaard's thought and life transcended this one preoccu-
pation in his writing. It is this issue, I believe, that constitutes the 'hidden 
message' of this book.24 
Green sees Kierkegaard as drawing here the consequences of Kant's analysis 
of evil in his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, consequences that 
Kant did not draw because of his 'enlightenment' presuppositions, conse-
quences that were the same as those drawn by Paul, Augustine, and Luther 
regarding the human condition.25 He goes on to say: 
Ethics must not be the highest possibility of human existence, as Kant in his 
most optimistic moods wanted to believe. It must instead be transcended by 
a more ultimate possibility in which forgiveness and the suspension of mer-
ited punishment become realities. In short, it must be possible for there to be 
a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.' 26 
For Green, it is this teleological suspension of the ethical, rather than that in 
which a divine command suspends the ethical as the universal, which is the 
key to the book. For without this suspension, we are all 'lost,' even Abraham. 
Thus, for him, it is the issue of sin and grace, rather than the issue of divine 
command morality that is the central focus of the bookY 
I tend to agree almost entirely with Green. On the obstacles to marriage, 
Kierkegaard tells us: "A penitent such as I was, my vita ante acta, my mel-
ancholy, that was enough."28 The problem of sin and the "teleological sus-
pension" that Green emphasizes, the "suspension" of being unable to realize 
the demands of the ethical, is central. Indeed, the verdict on ethics had already 
been pronounced in the "ultimatum" attached to Either/Or. On the other hand, 
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the issue of divine command morality is also central to the book. The only 
question is the character of such a morality. There is implicit, we have said, 
in Fear and Trembling an ethic of "agapism," an ethic based on the Royal 
Law, an ethic that points forward to the Works of Love where Christianity is 
called the "true ethic."29 It is our duty to love our neighbor and God (FT, 68.) 
The basis of such a 'thou shalt' is that God himself is love. Those who raise 
the possibility that such a "commander" could be a capricious despot forget 
this "is." Kierkegaard is convinced, as is Johannes, that God is love (FT, 34.) 
As Jeremy Walker has said: "For SK, as for all orthodox Christians, God's 
will is his love-his love is his will."30 In this sense, Kierkegaard's view does 
not seem to be subject to the usual objections to the divine command theory. 
God's commands flow from his nature. Further, we are to love God because 
He first loved us. As Phillips has put it: "To understand what it means to 
believe in [such a] God is to understand why God must be obeyed."3l 
Thus, in a sense, Abraham's "suspension of the ethical" could be seen as 
a suspension of a lower "ethical" by a higher "ethical." For this reason, some 
interpreters of Kierkegaard see his position as involving an extension of the 
ethical rather than an abrogation of it. 32 One may do this as long as one 
realizes that his position and the Kantian-Hegelian conception represent also 
conflicting conceptions of the ethical. Whereas for Kant one gets one's "or-
ders" from Reason, from oneself, and for Hegel from one's position in society, 
Abraham takes his "orders" as an individual from God. Yet, that there is a 
connection between these two kinds of duties, one's "ethical" duty and the 
"will of God," is indicated by another passage in the Journals: "The terrifying 
thing in the collision is that; that it is not a collision between God's command 
and man's command but between God's command and God's command" (JP, 
1, #908.) The conflict between the ethical and the religious is thus, in some 
sense, a religious conflict. Thus, perhaps it would be better to speak of 
Abraham's situation as involving a "teleological suspension of the religious" 
by the religious. 33 On this view, Abraham's action would involve a belief that 
a more general divine command had been "suspended" or overridden by a 
special divine command directed to him as an individuaJ.34 Interestingly 
enough, this is just the interpretation that Scotus places upon the situation. 
For St. Thomas, though God might command an act "contrary to the wonted 
mode of virtue," as in the case of Abraham, such a command did not involve 
any suspension or dispensation of the natural law or of the fifth command-
ment. The command is only an exceptional expression of God's supreme 
dominion over alllife. 35 On the other hand, in his response, the Subtle Doctor 
distinguishes between the natural law understood in a strict sense and in a 
broad sense.36 It is only as understood in the strict sense that he agrees with 
St. Thomas that God cannot dispense with a commandment of the natural 
law. Only the commandments of the first table, those dealing with duties to 
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God, meet this strict criterion. God, being Love, cannot command others to 
hate Him. He cannot issue a self-contradictory command. Scotus argues, 
however, that the precepts of the second table, those dealing with duties to 
others, belong to the natural law only in a broad sense. They cannot be 
deduced from the requirement that we must love God, nor from the com-
mandment that we must love our neighbor. God, therefore, can issue a dis-
pensation, or suspend these commandments, as He did in the case of 
Abraham. Scotus thus admits an element of contingency with regard to these 
commandments that is not admitted by St. Thomas. It is this element of 
contingency, of course, that led to the "despotic" interpretation cited earlier. 
Interpreters of Scotus have rightly challenged such an interpretation. God's 
commands follow from his nature, which is love. It is true that the basis of 
such contingency is God's liberty, that He is determined by nothing other 
than Himself. As Efrem Bettoni says: "To say that for Duns Scotus the basis 
of morality is the will of God is by no means incorrect. But care should be 
taken not to confuse this will with caprice or arbitrariness. It should rather 
be understood as that kind of will whereby God est rationabilissime et ordi-
natissime volens."37 Thus, God wills in a "most reasonable and orderly man-
ner." Hence while Capek may be correct in linking Kierkegaard with Scotus, 
it would seem that he is wrong in speaking of the "Scotist-Kierkegaardian 
claim that God is beyond good and evil."38 
There are, however, some points on which his position differs from that of 
Scotus. The latter followed most other theologians in contending that Abraham 
was justified in acting as he did because he was certain that the command 
came from God. Some have seen Kierkegaard as advocating such a view. 39 
It is true that Johannes does say of Abraham: "But he did not doubt, he did 
not look in anguish to the left and to the right, he did not challenge heaven 
with his prayers. He knew that it was God the almighty who was testing 
him ... " (FT, 22.) This passage occurs in Johannes' eulogy of Abraham. Jo-
hannes presents a highly idealized and poetized picture of Abraham. As the 
father of faith, it would not be appropriate to depict him as irresolute and 
dOUbting. (The Bible does not.) On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile 
the view of Abraham as certain with what he says elsewhere about the anguish 
of Abraham (FT, 52.) Whatever the view of Johannes, it is clear from what 
Kierkegaard says elsewhere that faith always involves an element of "objec-
tive uncertainty." God being who He is, it seems that the possibility of an 
immediate relation is ruled out. For that reason, most interpreters contend 
that Abraham, while he may be resolute, cannot be certain that the command 
comes from God. 40 
The other point of difference arises over what might be called Kierkegaard's 
"individualism." One of the recurrent themes of Fear and Trembling is that 
the individual must discover for himself what it is that God requires of him. 
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As Johannes de Silentio puts it, "Only the single individual can ever give 
himself a more explicit explanation of what is to be understood by Isaac" 
(FT, 71.) Kierkegaard came to believe that the task required of him demanded 
that he live outside the "universal." Such is not required of everyone. As 
Johannes sees it, people are assigned different tasks and the single individual 
may find his task within the universal (FT, 75-76.) Indeed, it seems that this 
is where most of us will find what Kierkegaard calls in Purity of Heart our 
"eternal vocation."41 On the other hand, the Royal Law, as he says later in 
the Works of Love, may demand the sacrifice of particular love-relationships 
such as that between man and wife.42 Again, it is a matter between the 
individual and God. He writes there: 
Moreover, if it were not a fact that one man, honest, sincere, respectable and 
God-fearing, can under the same circumstances do exactly the opposite of 
what another man does, who is also honest, sincere, respectable and God-
fearing; then the God-relationship would not essentially exist, not in its most 
profound significance. If one were able with absolute truth to judge every 
man according to a common pattern, then would the God-relationship be 
essentially abolished; then would everything face outward, heathenishly find-
ing its complete expression in the state and community life ... 43 
Kierkegaard's position is connected with the Pauline conception of love as 
the fulfillment of the law.44 As problematic and anxiety-provoking as it may 
be, it is the task of the individual to decide for him or herself-in "fear and 
trembling"-what Love requires of them. 
This brings us back, however, to the disturbing figure of Abraham. Al-
though we have altered the picture of God, we still have the question, indeed 
it is all the more insistent now, how could God command Abraham to sacrifice 
his son? How could such an action be an expression of love of God and 
neighbor? How could "faith" sanction such a barbaric act? It must be admitted 
that many Christian thinkers as well as Jewish thinkers have believed that 
God did issue such a command.45 After all, the Bible says He did. Indeed, 
until the nineteenth century and the advent of Biblical criticism, this was the 
"received" view. Abraham is depicted as believing that God had the right to 
issue such a command. He does not plead his cause-or the cause of his 
innocent son-as he did the cause of the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah 
(FT, 21.) It must also be admitted that Kierkegaard himself may have be-
longed to this group of believers. Like them, he sees God as the Lord and 
giver of life; what God gives He can take back. The movement of infinite 
resignation requires that one be willing to give up, to sacrifice, everything. 
Still, to take the knife to one's own son? 
A traditional way of mitigating the difficulty is, of course, to insist that 
God did not really command Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. He may have told 
him to carry out the act, but He did not intend for him to do it. This inter-
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pretation very early became a part of the Jewish tradition. As Shalom Spiegel 
points out: 
To be sure, the Talmudic Sages never wearied of repeating once and again 
what occurs again and once again in the Prophets: 'Which I commanded not, 
nor spoke it, neither came it into My mind.' (Jer. 19:5)-1 did not command 
Jephthah to sacrifice his daughter, 1 did not speak to the king of Moab 
(saying) that he should sacrifice his son, neither came it into My mind to ten 
Abraham to slay his son ... 46 
It is emphasized that, after all, Abraham did not sacrifice Isaac; the whole 
affair was only a test. Is this not clearly indicated by the first verse of the 
chapter, 'And God tested Abraham .. .'? Johannes is himself willing to grant 
this point, provided that we remember that Abraham did not know that it was 
a test. Again, he is willing to admit that the story ends happily; Abraham does 
get Isaac back, but only after he has walked the lonely and terrifying path up 
Mt. Moriah. 
As a "master of irony" no doubt such a reading could have appealed to 
Kierkegaard. There are, however, serious difficulties with such an interpre-
tation. Why subject Abraham to such a cruel test? Johannes himself asks, 
Who is this who seizes the staff from the old man, who is this who demands 
that he himself shan break it! ... Is there no sympathy for this venerable old 
man, none for the innocent child? And yet Abraham was God's chosen one, 
and it was the Lord who imposed the ordeal [Provelse]. (FT, 19) 
To say that God wanted to 'know' whether Abraham would pass the test, as 
seems to be indicated by the passage 'Now I know ... ,' does not square with 
the belief in God's omniscience. The traditional response is that the test is 
imposed so that Abraham might show himself worthy of the promise and that 
he might serve as an example of faith. Still, such an approach seems to make 
God a dissembler whose "commands" may not reflect his true will. Also, 
while such an interpretation shifts the emphasis of the story to the second 
command, it does not eliminate the first. We still have the picture of two 
commands, one rescinding the other. 
There is a more radical way of reading the Abraham story. This is to say 
that while Abraham believed that he had been commanded to sacrifice his 
son, he need not have been so commanded. Is there any basis for reading the 
story this way-or for reading Kierkegaard's version of the story this way? 
Certainly, at first glance, it does not seem that Johannes de Silentio reads the 
story this way. He appears to treat the story "literally"-in the sense that it 
involves two commands from God, the first "suspending the ethical" and the 
second "giving back" Isaac. As he says: "The story of Abraham contains, 
then, a teleological suspension of the ethical...If this is not Abraham's situ-
ation, then Abraham is not even a tragic hero but a murderer" (FT, 66.) If 
such is not the case, then faith does not exist. Yet Johannes is also a poet who 
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is given to imagining various possible scenarios, other ways in which the 
story might have happened. In his hands, the story at times begins to take on 
the character of a fairy tale. He is also exceedingly concerned lest anyone 
take it upon himself to emulate Abraham (FT, 28f.) That he himself seems 
uncertain whether Abraham did in fact receive such a command is indicated 
by his worry that Abraham might have been mistaken (FT, 61.) The feature 
that Johannes insists upon is that Abraham believed that God required such 
a sacrifice of him. As it turned out, God did not require such a sacrifice. Thus 
in this sense, Abraham's belief was "mistaken." He did, fortunately, come to 
believe that he was not to sacrifice Isaac. 
Is Johannes, is Kierkegaard, trying to caution us here against a "literal" 
reading of the story? Might Abraham still serve as an exemplar of faith, even 
though he was "mistaken" in thinking that God required him to take the knife 
to his son? That Abraham possessed the "formal" qualifications of faith, i.e. 
that he believed against the understanding, need not necessarily imply that 
the 'what' of faith, at least with regard to the command to sacrifice Isaac, 
was in fact correct. Anyone familiar with the writings of Kierkegaard will 
surely call to mind here the "truth is subjectivity" thesis of the Postscript-a 
thesis that is especially applicable to the account of faith at the level of 
Religion A-of which Abraham would seem to be an exemplar.47 
My suggestion is that we read the story in the light of this thesis. There are 
many difficulties raised by such a suggestion, not the least of which is that 
without the first divine command the story of Abraham would no longer seem 
to contain a "teleological suspension of the ethical." There is also 
Kierkegaard's description of Abraham's conflict as a conflict of two divine 
commands. There is finally his acceptance of the Bible as God's Word. The 
second of these could be resolved by saying that this is how Kierkegaard sees 
Abraham as understanding the conflict. Let us consider the other two in 
reverse order. While Kierkegaard accepted the Bible as God's revelation, he 
was obviously aware of the historical-critical approach and was not himself 
a "literalist."48 Also he was not above, as we have seen, criticizing the Old 
Testament and Jewish conception of God. In the Old Testament, God is seen 
as "through a glass darkly." Only with God's revelation of Himself in Christ, 
and even there He does not reveal Himself "immediately," do we have a full 
expression of God's nature as Love, a "pattern" to guide us in our efforts to 
become a subject in truth. It is also interesting to note the difference between 
the double-movement of faith in Fear and Trembling and the Discourses. In 
the latter, to expect something special, something particular, is said to be to 
lack faith. Abraham, on the other hand, believes that he will get Isaac back. 
Only in Fear and Trembling and in Repetition, where Job is the focal figure, 
is faith described in terms of -receiving back the finite in a particular sense. 
The emphasis on the particular in these works may be due to the fact that 
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both focal figures were Jewish, and that they represented a life possibility 
that needed to be presented as a part of his comprehensive project to map out 
such possibilities.49 They do represent in this sense a characteristic feature of 
Judaism.50 We have noted that it seems that Kierkegaard, while he was writing 
Fear and Trembling, may very well have been struggling with this possibility, 
the possibility that he might also get Regine back. 
Kierkegaard's "struggle" here can be seen as representative of the "build-
ing" of faith or the "strengthening" of the inner man. One hopes, one prays 
to God for some thing, for some possibility that might be granted by Him to 
whom all things are possible. One's hope, one's wish, however, may be 
denied. Yet, one may come to perceive this denial, and the whole world along 
with it, as a gift from the hand of God. Only through such faith can one 
receive back the whole of the temporal. This would seem to be import of the 
picture of the ordinary knight of faith in Fear and Trembling (FT, 38f.) It is this 
double-movement, the double-movement of the Discourses, rather than that 
illustrated by Abraham, that is fundamental. In this sense, the "faith" of the 
Discourses does seem to "go further" than that represented by Abraham.51 
The crucial difficulty with the reading that we have proposed is that the 
story of Abraham would no longer seem to contain a "teleological suspension 
of the ethical." Is the "suspension" involved that of God's acceptance of 
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, when such a sacrifice was not 
literally required of him? One may certainly wonder if we have here not only 
"gone further" than Abraham but also beyond Kierkegaard. 52 Indeed, one 
might well wonder if we have not removed the "fear and trembling" from 
Fear and Trembling. On this reading, the story in Genesis 22 would not 
actually require a "teleological suspension of the ethical." Is not such a 
reading, however, more consistent with the picture of God as unchanging 
Love, the picture of God in the Discourses, than that of God as issuing and 
rescinding commands?53 On this point, it is interesting to note what 
Kierkegaard has to say in the Discourses about Abraham's pleading with God 
to change his mind about punishing the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah. To 
speak of God in this way, as the Bible does, is said to 'speak humanly.'54 
Could it be that the description of God as issuing and rescinding commands, 
of finding out something he did not know before, is also to 'speak humanly'? 
In short, is it that we ought not to read the story in Genesis 22 literally? Might 
it be that the story can serve as an illustration of the "teleological suspension 
of the ethical" and Abraham can remain an exemplar of faith without its being 
taken "literally"? 
While such a reading may be Kierkegaardian in spirit, I am not completely 
convinced that it is Kierkegaardian in fact. Kierkegaard notes at one point in 
the Discourses how what we see, especially in matters pertaining to the spirit, 
depends on the seer. In our "rereading" perhaps we are "reading into" the 
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text what we want to find there. Whether this is so, it seems that each reader 
must decide for him or herself. Even so, such a reading still leaves us with 
the possibility of "teleological suspensions of the ethical," with the possibility 
of "conflicts" like those illustrated by the story of Abraham, and by 
Kierkegaard's own situation. Indeed, that there can be such "conflicts" might 
very well be seen as the moral of Fear and Trembling. In the final analysis, 
the work does advocate the primacy of a religious ethic. Nor can we eliminate 
the element of "fear and trembling" from the religious life. 55 The demand of 
love and the "covering" of love must both be present. One must live with the 
possibility that the demand of Love may conflict not only with our own 
desires but also bring us into conflict with others and society.56 In this sense, 
the "call to sacrifice," the first command, cannot be eliminated. Nor is there 
any "objective" means of settling such "conflicts." Still, while one must walk 
one's own path in "fear and trembling," one need not for Kierkegaard, thanks 
to God's revelation in Christ, go one's way without a Pattern, or without Help. 
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